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SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE. BY Bruce A. Ackerman. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 1980. Pp. xii, 392. $5.95. 
The publication of John Rawls's A Theory of Justice 1 in 1971 
stands as a milestone in the history of liberal political philosophy. 
Social Justice in the Liberal State, by Bruce Ackerman, is the latest 
attempt to rival Rawls's contribution to liberalism. Employing the 
Socratic conception of political dialogue, this approachable book es-
pouses political programs typical of left-of-center "liberal"2 politics 
as practiced in modem America. 
Ackerman characterizes political theory as a dialogic process 
where individuals critically evaluate each other's assertions of 
power.3 As the book progresses, the dialogue becomes a stylistic de-
vice in addition to a defining trait of political theory as a cast of 
hypothetical characters challenge one another for power. Ackerman 
places three restrictions on the characters' quest for political princi-
ples. The first two dialogic constraints, the requirements of "rational-
ity"4 and "consistency,"5 are uncontroversial; indeed, they furnish 
the basis for any meaningful dialogue in Western thought. The CO)?.· 
straint that Ackerman labels "neutrality"6 is more provocative. The 
very foundation of liberal political theory,7 this principle holds that 
no citizen may defend his power by asserting that his conception of 
the good is intrinsically better than those of his fellow citizens. Ack-
erman devotes the bulk of his book to developing the concrete polit-
ical positions that follow from the neutrality principle. He divides 
this effort into two parts, sketching the features of both utopian and 
real-world liberal positions. 
1. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE {1971). 
2. The philosopher's "liberalism" may be quite unrelated to what bears that name in the 
political arena. In this sentence, "liberal" is meant in its second sense. 
3. Power is used here in its broadest sense. It includes not only the power of political 
office, but also the power to own property, to operate an automobile, to eat when one is hun-
gry; in short, the power to do anything that humans can do. 
4. "Rationality: Whenever anybody questions the legitimacy of another's power, the 
power holder must respond not by suppressing the questioner but by giving a reason that 
explains why he is more entitled to the resource than the questioner is." P. 4. 
5. "Consistency. The reason advanced by a power wielder on one occasion must not be 
inconsistent with the reasons he advances to justify his other claims to power." P. 7. 
6. Neutrality. No reason is a good reason if it requires the power holder to assert: 
(a) that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens, 
or 
(b) that, regardless of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically superior to one or 
more of his fellow citizens. 
P. 11. The second element - that no citizen may assert his intrinsic superiority to any other 
citizen - seelllS to be a corollary of the first - that no one may assert an intrinsically superior 
conception of the good. 
7. See Three Concepts ef Liberalism, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 14, 1979, at 45, 47 (dia-
logue between Bryan Magee and Ronald Dworkin). 
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Social Justice first examines basic political principles in a fantas-
tic setting uncomplicated by the scarce resources and imperfections 
of the real world. The fantasy involves members of a spaceship crew 
who debate how to structure a new world. The new world has only 
one resource, "manna," that can be converted into any of the more 
tangible resources that people use. The characters accept the three 
dialogic constraints of liberalism and rely on a Solomonic Com-
mander to interpret and enforce those constraints. The most basic 
conclusion to emerge from the spaceship dialogue asserts that manna 
must be distributed equally. Because no party may assert a superior 
conception of the good, the crew reasons that each person has an 
equal claim to manna. 
Ackerman next considers several issues related to future genera-
tions. Regarding intergenerational trusteeship and inheritance, he 
argues for both intergenerational and intragenerational equality. 
Each member of a new generation must begin with an equal share of 
manna, and the share must be at least as large as the initial share 
given to each member of the preceding generation. Social Justice 
also addresses popularly disputed issues such as contraception, abor-
tion, and genetic manipulation, resolving them all in fashionably lib-
eral ways.8 Liberal education receives substantial treatment. 
Ackerman claims that education too often seeks to mold children 
into the mirror images of their parents. He believes that education 
should expose students to as many ideas as possible, so long as those 
ideas are not, like Nazism, antithetical to the neutrality principle. As 
the budding citizen develops a respect for the multiplicity of 
thoughts and values of others, parental and other educational restric-
tions gradually may be lifted so that he may become a full-fl.edged 
citizen of the liberal state. 
All in all, Ackerman paints a rosy picture of the liberal utopia. 
This enviable world allows free intellectual exchange and also per-
fectly screens all the activities of some individuals from others who 
do not wish to be affected. I may, if I choose, smell my neighbor's 
barbecue (unless he chooses to screen it from me), but I need not 
smell his car's exhaust fumes. 
The second step in the development of the liberal program is 
Ackerman's most difficult. Social Justice resorts to a "second-best" 
argument, and attempts to apply the principles developed in the 
spaceship fantasy to the real world. In the real world, the technology 
that enforces liberal ideals is neither perfect nor free. Ackerman ad-
mits that statesmen may legitimately disagree about how the liberal 
state can best promote self-fulfillment in a world of scarcity. Liberal 
citizens can justifiably use a variety of procedures to resolve their 
8. Contraception: "a fundamental right of all citizens." P. 126. Abortion: allowed in most 
situations, but not, e.g., because the parents are unhappy with the fetus's sex or eye color. Pp. 
127-28. Genetic manipulation: not allowed. Pp. 120-24. 
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good faith disagreements. Majority rule, for instance, satisfies the 
neutrality principle because it does not purport to recommend one 
political view as intrinsically superior to another. Ackerman never-
theless concedes that a good lottery meets the same requirements of 
a "neutral" decision-making process. 
Ackerman is careful to exclude from the political arena only ex-
ploitative policy choices, those that harm a particular group of citi-
zens. He realizes that the problem of exploitation is not magically 
self-solving. Controls are needed in the real world to preserve the 
very possibility of liberal dialogue.9 Here, Social Justice becomes 
vulnerable to criticism. The book fails to address how the liberal 
polity decides where controls may legitimately be imposed - where 
statements or activities are so insufficiently neutral that they must be 
prohibited. In the dialogues, all the characters accept the Com-
mander's judgments regarding neutrality. In real life, however, the 
meaning of neutral principles is not so transparent. Because no lit-
mus test exists to determine whether given statements or activities 
adhere to the neutrality principle, one expects that citizens will have 
good faith disagreements.10 
A more general shortcoming flaws Ackerman's attempt to apply 
fantasy-derived principles to the real world. The hardest and most 
important choices that liberals must confront are the ones given the 
shortest treatment. How, one might ask, can resources be allocated 
for future generations when the number and preferences of those 
generations cannot be known with perfect prescience? Similarly, 
how should resources be allocated when distributional flaws render 
truly equal distribution impossible, or when all may starve because 
the equal distribution is too small? Unfortunately, Ackerman pro-
vides little guidance on these troubling issues. 
In the book's final part, Ackerman attempts to justify liberalism's 
foundational principle of neutrality. He first criticizes Rawls's jus-
tice-as-fairness and utilitarian theories for simply assuming their first 
principles. According to Ackerman, Rawls's theory ultimately de-
pends on unquestioned "intuitions" that, in fact, might mask cultural 
biases. And the utilitarian, he maintains, presupposes that his own 
pleasure does not generate a moral claim superior to that presented 
by the pleasure of others, a stance that Ackerman finds anti-individ-
ualistic. In contrast to its two competitors, Ackerman's dialogue-
based theory purports to take nothing for granted. The author 
suggests that four independent justifications exist for the neutrality 
principle and, hence, for the liberal state: "realism about the cor-
9. These are classified as input controls, e.g., banning authoritarians from government of-
fice; process controls, e.g., a system of checks and balances; and output controls, e.g., a bill of 
rights. 
10. This seems especially true since Ackerman's citizens, unlike those behind Rawls's veil 
of ignorance, must make decisions with full awareness of their earthly vested interests. 
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rosiveness of power; recognition of doubt as a necessary step to 
moral knowledge; respect for the autonomy of persons; and skepti-
cism concerning the reality of transcendent meaning" (p. 369). 
Social Justice, however, says little about the reasonableness of 
these "four . . . main highways to the liberal state" (p. 369). These 
principles clearly stand in need of justification: The autonomy of 
persons and moral skepticism, for instance, are not universally ac-
cepted propositions in our own culture, let alone the rest of the 
world. Since Ackerman has distanced himself from metaphysics, in-
tuitionism, and "pure reason," it is not clear how he can finally sup-
port the neutrality principle. Ultimately, Ackerman's state may 
depend on an unexamined acceptance of liberal principles, and So-
cial Justice may not be exempt from the criticisms that it registers 
against Rawls and the utilitarians. 
On one level, Social Justice succeeds in bringing a coherent 
framework to the disparate policies advocated by modem liberals. 
Stylistically, the dialogues, while at times sounding like stilted ex-
pressions of the philosopher's preconceived outcomes, make Acker-
man's effort more accessible than much political philosophy. On a 
more basic level, however, Ackerman ultimately ignores the earthly 
reality that liberal democracy - or any political system - is a 
means that men use to attain deeply felt substantive beliefs rather 
than an end in itself. By divorcing the political system from substan-
tive goals, Ackerman offers a possibly unique creature: an end-less 
means. Its uniqueness, though, does not guarantee its rightness. 
"An open mind is a great idea," wrote journalist Heywood Broun, 
"but if you make it your primary aim in life, what you'll end up with 
will more resemble a cave of winds."11 
11. Quoted in P. SEEGER, THE INCOMPLEAT FOLKSINGER 3 (1972). 
Social JI/Stice in the Liberal State is also reviewed by Wolfe, Liberal Foundations for Liber• 
alism?, 1981 PuB. INT.125; Walzer, Book Review, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 25, 1980, at 39; Orwin, 
As Good As You, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1980, § 7 (Book Review), at 14. 
